Long-run Consumption Risk and Asset Allocation under Recursive Utility and Rational Inattention by Luo, Yulei & Young, Eric
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Long-run Consumption Risk and Asset
Allocation under Recursive Utility and
Rational Inattention
Yulei Luo and Eric Young
The University of Hong Kong, University of Virginia
8 July 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57112/
MPRA Paper No. 57112, posted 5 July 2014 06:16 UTC
Long-run Consumption Risk and Asset Allocation
under Recursive Utility and Rational Inattention∗
Yulei Luo†
University of Hong Kong
Eric R. Young‡
University of Virginia
Abstract
We study the portfolio decision of a household with limited information-processing capacity
(rational inattention or RI) in a setting with recursive utility. We find that rational inattention
combined with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty could lead to a significant drop
in the share of portfolios held in risky assets, even when the departure from standard expected
utility with rational expectations is small. In addition, we show that the equilibrium equity
premium increases with the degree of inattention because inattentive investors with recursive
utility face greater long-run risk and thus require higher compensation in equilibrium. Our
results are robust to the presence of correlation between the equity return and the RI-induced
noise and the presence of non-tradable labor income.
JEL Classification Numbers: D53, D81, G11.
Keywords: Rational Inattention, Recursive Utility, Portfolio Choice, Asset Pricing.
∗We thank Pok-sang Lam (the Editor) and two anonymous referees for many constructive comments and sug-
gestions. We are also grateful for useful suggestions and comments from Hengjie Ai, Michael Haliassos, Winfried
Koeniger, Jonathan Parker, Chris Sims, and Wei Xiong, as well as seminar and conference participants at European
University Institute, University of Warwick, University of Hong Kong, Utah State University, the North Ameri-
can Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, and the SED conference for helpful comments and suggestions.
Luo thanks the Hong Kong General Research Fund (GRF) and HKU seed funding program for basic research for
financial support.
† Corresponding author. School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. Email:
yluo@econ.hku.hk.
‡ Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904. E-mail: ey2d@virginia.edu.
1 Introduction
The canonical optimal consumption-portfolio choice models implicitly assume that consumers
and investors have unlimited information-processing capacity and thus can observe the state
variable(s) without errors; consequently, they can adjust their optimal plans instantaneously and
completely to innovations to equity returns. However, plenty of evidence exists that ordinary
people only have limited information-processing capacity and face many competing demands for
their attention. As a result, agents react to the innovations slowly and incompletely because the
channel along which information flows – the Shannon channel – cannot carry an infinite amount
of information. In Sims (2003), this type of information-processing limitation is termed “Rational
Inattention”(henceforth, RI). In the RI framework, entropy is used to measure the uncertainty of
a random variable, and the reduction in the entropy is used to measure information flow.1 For
finite Shannon channel capacity, the reduction in entropy is bounded above; as capacity becomes
infinitely large, the RI model converges to the standard full-information rational expectations
(RE) model.2
Luo (2010) applies the RI hypothesis in the intertemporal portfolio choice model with time
separable preferences in the vein of Merton (1969) and shows that RI alters the optimal choice of
portfolio as well as the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and asset returns. In particular,
limited information-processing capacity leads to smaller shares of risky assets. However, to
generate the observed share and realistic joint dynamics of aggregate consumption and asset
returns, the degree of attention must be as low as 10 percent (the corresponding Shannon capacity
is 0.08 bits of information); this number means that only 10 percent of the uncertainty is removed
in each period upon receiving a new signal about the aggregate shock to the equity return.
Since we cannot estimate the degree of average inattention directly (that is, without a model),
it is difficult to determine whether this limit is empirically reasonable. Indirect measurements
of capacity uncover significantly higher channel capacity; we discuss them explicitly later in the
paper.3
1Entropy of a random variable X with density p (X) is defined as E [log (p (X))]. Cover and Thomas (1991) is
a standard introduction to information theory and the notion of entropy.
2There are a number of papers that study decisions within the LQ-RI framework: Sims (2003, 2006), Adam
(2005), Luo (2008, 2010), Mac´kowiak, and Wiederholt (2009), and Luo and Young (2010a,b).
3The effect of RI on consumption growth and asset prices in the standard expected utility framework has been
examined in Luo and Young (2010a). That paper showed that an agent with incomplete information-processing
ability will require a higher return to hold a risky asset because RI introduces (i) higher volatility into consumption
and (ii) positive autocorrelation into consumption growth. In addition, Luo and Young (2010b) examine how the
risk-sensitive preferences, a special case of Epstein-Zin recursive utility, affects consumption, precautionary savings,
and the welfare of inattentive agents.
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The preferences used in Luo (2010) are known to entangle two distinct aspects of prefer-
ences. Risk aversion measures the distaste for marginal utility variation across states of the
world, while the elasticity of intertemporal substitution measures the distaste for deterministic
variation of consumption across time; with expected utility these two attitudes are controlled by
a single parameter such that if risk aversion increases the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
must fall. The result in Luo (2010) shows that RI interacts with this parameter in a way that
raises the apparent risk aversion (lowers the apparent intertemporal substitution elasticity) of
the investor; however, it is unclear which aspect of preferences is actually being altered. As a
result, interpretation of the results is ambiguous. Here, we develop an RI-Portfolio choice model
within the recursive utility (RU) framework and use it to examine the effects of RI and RU on
long-run consumption risk and optimal asset allocation. Specifically, we adopt preferences from
the class studied by Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989), where risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution are disentangled. These preferences also break indifference to the
timing of the resolution of uncertainty, an aspect of preferences that plays an important role in
determining the demand for risky assets (see Backus, Routledge, and Zin 2007). Indeed, it turns
out that this aspect of preferences is key.
For tractability reasons we are confined to small deviations away from the standard class of
preferences. However, we find that even a small deviation from unlimited information-processing
capacity will lead to large changes in portfolio allocation if investors prefer early resolution of
uncertainty. The intuition for this result lies in the long-term risk that equities pose: with rational
inattention, uncertainty about the value of the equity return (and therefore the marginal utility
of consumption) is not resolved for (infinitely) many periods. This postponement of information
is distasteful to agents who prefer early resolution of uncertainty, causing them to prefer an
asset with an even and certain intertemporal payoff (the risk-free asset); in the standard time-
separable expected utility framework, agents must be indifferent to the timing of the resolution of
uncertainty, preventing the model in Luo (2010) from producing significant effects without very
low channel capacity. Due to the nature of the accumulation of uncertainty, even small deviations
from indifference (again, in the direction of preference for early resolution) combined with small
deviations from complete information-processing leads to large declines in optimal risky asset
shares. Thus, we provide a theory for why agents hold such a small share of risky assets without
requiring extreme values for preference parameters.
This result is based on the fact that RI introduces positive autocorrelation into consumption
growth, i.e., consumption under RI reacts gradually to the wealth shock.4 Here we show that
4Reis (2006) showed that inattentiveness due to costly planning could lead to slow adjustment of aggregate
consumption to income shocks. The main difference between the implications of RI and Reis’ inattentiveness
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this effect may be amplified by a preference for early resolution of uncertainty and can become
quite large, even when the deviation from indifference is arbitrarily small. Around the expected
utility setting with unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution and relative risk aversion, what
matters for the size of this effect is the relative size of the deviation in IES from 1 as compared
to the size of the deviation from relative risk aversion of 1.
To explore the equilibrium asset pricing implications of RU and RI, we consider a simple
exchange economy in the vein of Lucas (1978) using the optimal consumption and portfolio rules.
Specifically, we assume that in equilibrium the representative agent receives an endowment, which
equals optimal consumption obtained in the consumption-portfolio choice model, and can trade
two assets: a risky asset entitling the consumer to the endowment and a riskless asset with zero net
supply. Using the optimal consumption and portfolio rules and the market-clearing condition, we
find that how the interaction of RU and RI significantly increase the equilibrium equity premium
and also improve the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and the equity return.
We consider two important extensions. First, we permit correlation between the equity re-
turn and the RI-induced noise.5 We find that the sign of the correlation affects the long-run
consumption and optimal asset allocation. Specifically, a negative correlation will further reduce
the optimal share invested in the risky asset. We then present the results of adding nontradable
labor income into the model, generating a hedging demand for risky equities. We find that our
results survive essentially unchanged – rational inattention combined with a preference of early
resolution of uncertainty still decreases the share of risky assets in the portfolio for small devia-
tions around standard log preferences. In addition, we find that the importance of the hedging
demand for equities is increasing in the degree of rational inattention. As agents become more
constrained, they suffer more from uncertainty about consumption; thus, they are more interested
in holding equities if they negatively covary with the labor income shock and less interested if
they positively covary. Given that the data support a small correlation between individual wage
income and aggregate stock returns (Heaton and Lucas 2000), our results survive this extension
intact.
Our model is closely related to van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) and Mondria (2010).
van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) discuss the relationship between information acquisition,
the preference for early resolution of uncertainty, and portfolio choice in a static model broken into
for consumption behavior is that in the inattentiveness economy individuals adjust consumption infrequently but
completely once they choose to adjust and aggregate consumption stickiness comes from aggregating across all
individuals, whereas individuals under RI adjust their optimal consumption plans frequently but incompletely and
aggregate consumption stickiness comes from individuals’ incomplete consumption adjustments.
5This assumption generalizes the iid noise assumption used in Sims (2003) and Luo (2010).
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three periods. Specifically, they find that information acquisition help resolves the uncertainty
surrounding asset payoffs; consequently, an investor may prefer early resolution of uncertainty
either because he has Epstein-Zin preferences or because he can use the early information to
adjust his portfolio. In other words, van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) focuses on the
static portfolio under-diversification problem with information acquisition, while we focus on
the dynamic aspect of the interaction between incomplete information and recursive preferences.
Mondria (2010) also considers two-period portfolio choice model with correlated risky assets in
which investors choose the composition of their attention subject to an information flow constraint.
He shows that there is an equilibrium in which all investors choose to observe a linear combination
of these asset payoffs as a private signal. In contrast, the mechanism of our model is based on the
effects of the interplay of the preference for early resolution of uncertainty and finite capacity on
the dynamic response of consumption to the shock to the equity return that determines the long-
run consumption risk; in our model, the preference for early resolution of uncertainty amplifies
the role of finite information-processing capacity in generating greater long-run risk.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and reviews an otherwise standard
two-asset portfolio choice model with recursive utility. Section 3 solves an RI version of the RU
model and examines the implications of the interactions of RI, the separation of risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution, and the discount factor for the optimal portfolio rule and the
equilibrium equity premium. Section 4 discusses two extensions: the presence of the correlation
between the equity return and the noise and the introduction of nontradable labor income. Section
5 concludes and discusses the extension of the results to non-LQ environments. Appendices
contain the proofs and derivations that are omitted from the main text.
2 A Stylized Portfolio Choice Model with Rational Inattention
and Recursive Utility
In this section, we present and discuss a standard portfolio choice model within a recursive utility
framework. Following the log-linear approximation method proposed by Campbell (1993), Viceira
(2001), and Campbell and Viceira (1999, 2002), we then incorporate rational inattention into the
standard model and solve it explicitly after considering the long-run consumption risk facing the
investors. Another major advantage of the log-linearization approach is that we can obtain a
quadratic expected loss function by approximating the original value function from the nonlinear
problem when relative risk aversion is close to 1 and thus can justify Gaussian posterior uncertainty
under RI. We then discuss the interplay between RI, risk aversion, and intertemporal substitution
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for portfolio choice and asset pricing.
2.1 Specification and Solution of the Standard Recursive Utility Model of
Portfolio Choice
Before setting up and solving the portfolio choice model with RI, it is helpful to present the stan-
dard portfolio choice model first and then discuss how to introduce RI in this framework. Here we
consider a simple intertemporal model of portfolio choice with a continuum of identical investors.
Following Epstein and Zin (1989), Giovannini and Weil (1989), and Campbell and Viceira (1999),
suppose that investors maximize a recursive utility function Ut by choosing consumption and asset
holdings,
Ut =
{
(1− β)C1−1/σt + β (Et [Ut+1])(1−1/σ)/(1−γ)
} 1−γ
1−1/σ
, (1)
where Ct represents individual’s consumption at time t, β is the discount factor, γ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion over wealth gambles (CRRA), and σ is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.6 Let ρ = (1− γ) / (1− 1/σ); if ρ > 1, the household has a preference for early
resolution of uncertainty.
We assume that the investment opportunity set is constant and contains only two assets: asset
e is risky, with one-period log (continuously compounded) return re,t+1, while the other asset f
is riskless with constant log return given by rf . We refer to asset e as the market portfolio of
equities, and to asset f as the riskless bond. re,t+1 has expected return µ, µ − rf is the equity
premium, and re,t+1 has an unexpected component ut+1 with var [ut+1] = ω
2.7
The intertemporal budget constraint for the investor is
At+1 = Rp,t+1 (At − Ct) (2)
where At+1 is the individual’s financial wealth (the value of financial assets carried over from
period t at the beginning of period t + 1), At − Ct is current period savings, and Rp,t+1 is the
one-period gross return on savings given by
Rp,t+1 = αt (Re,t+1 −Rf ) +Rf (3)
6When γ = σ−1, ρ = 1 and the recursive utility reduces to the standard time-separable power utility with RRA γ
and intertemporal elasticity γ−1. When γ = σ = 1 the objective function is the time-separable log utility function.
7Under unlimited information-processing capacity two-fund separation theorems imply that this investment
opportunity set is sufficient. All agents would choose the same portfolio of multiple risky assets; differences in
preferences would manifest themselves only in terms of the share allocated to this risky portfolio versus the riskless
asset. We believe, but have not proven, that this result would go through under rational inattention as well.
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where Re,t+1 = exp (re,t+1) , Rf = exp (rf ) , and αt = α is the proportion of savings invested in
the risky asset.8 As in Campbell (1993), we can derive an approximate expression for the log
return on wealth:
rp,t+1 = α (re,t+1 − rf ) + rf + 1
2
α (1− α)ω2. (4)
Given the above model specification, it is well known that this simple discrete-time model can
not be solved analytically. We therefore follow the log-linearization method proposed in Campbell
(1993), Viceira (2001), and Campbell and Viceira (2002) to obtain a closed-form solution to an
approximation of this problem.9 Specifically, the original intertemporal budget constraint, (2),
can be written in log-linear form:
∆at+1 =
(
1− 1
φ
)
(ct − at) + ψ + rpt+1, (5)
where c − a = E [ct − at] is the unconditional (log of) consumption’s share of financial wealth,
φ = 1 − exp(c − a), ψ = log (φ) − (1 − 1/φ) log(1 − φ), and lowercase letters denote logs. Note
that the approximation, (5), holds exactly in our model because the consumption-wealth ratio
in the model with iid returns is constant.10 As shown in Viceira (2001), the assumptions on the
preference and the investment opportunity set ensure that along the optimal path, financial wealth
(At), savings (At−Ct), and consumption (Ct) are strictly positive. Because the marginal utility of
consumption approaches ∞ as consumption approaches zero, the investor chooses consumption-
savings and portfolio rules that ensure strictly positive consumption next period. Thus, we must
have At+1 > 0 and At − Ct > 0, so that the log of these objects is well-defined (note that the
intertemporal budget constraint implies that At−Ct > 0 is a necessary condition for next period’s
financial wealth to be positive). The optimal consumption and portfolio rules are then
ct = b0 + at, (6)
α =
µ− rf + 0.5ω2
(ρ/σ + 1− ρ)ω2 , (7)
8Given iid equity returns and a power utility function, αt will be constant over time.
9This method proceeds as follows. First, both the flow budget constraint and the consumption Euler equations
are log-approximated around the steady state. The Euler equations are log-approximated by a second-order Taylor
expansion so that the second-moment are included; these terms are constant and thus the resulting equation is
log-linear. Second, the optimal consumption and portfolio choices that satisfy these log-linearized equations are
chosen as log-linear functions of the state. Finally, the coefficients of these optimal decision rules are pinned down
using the method of undetermined coefficients.
10Campbell (1993) and Campbell and Viceira (1999) have shown that the approximation is exact when the
consumption-wealth ratio is constant over time, and becomes less accurate when the ratio becomes more volatile.
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where b0 = log
(
1− βσ
(
Et
[
R1−γp,t+1
])σ−1
1−γ
)
and ρσ + 1−ρ = γ.11 Note that in the full-information
RE model, b0 = log (1− φ) and φ = βσ when γ is close 1.
Two aspects of preferences play a role in determining the portfolio share α: intertemporal
substitution, measured by σ, and the preference for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty,
measured by ρ. A household who is highly intolerant of intertemporal variation in consumption
will have a high share of risky assets. If σ < 1, a household who prefers earlier resolution of
uncertainty (larger ρ) will have a lower share of risky assets. Using the identity this statement
is equivalent to noting that larger ρ means larger γ for fixed σ, so that more risk aversion also
implies lower share of risky assets. Thus, as noted in Epstein and Zin (1989), risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution, while disentangled from each other, are entwined with the preference
for the timing of uncertainty resolution.
We choose to focus on the temporal resolution aspect of preferences, rather than risk aversion,
for two reasons. First, results in Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2007) show a household with
infinite risk aversion and infinite intertemporal elasticity actually holds almost entirely risky
assets, and the opposite household (risk neutral with zero intertemporal elasticity) holds almost
none (when risks are shared efficiently, at least). The second household prefers early resolution
of uncertainty, a preference that cannot be expressed within the expected utility framework, and
thus prefers paths of consumption that are smooth, while the first household prefers paths of
utility that are smooth. Holding equities makes consumption risky, but not future utility, and
therefore the risk-neutral agent will avoid them. Second, it will turn out that rational inattention
will have a strong effect when combined with a preference regarding the timing of the resolution
of uncertainty, independent of the values of risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity; specifically,
our model will improve upon the standard model by reducing the portfolio share of risky assets
if the representative investor has a preference for early resolution.
3 RI-Recursive Utility Model
Given the optimal consumption and portfolio rules derived in the last section, it is straightforward
to show that the value function under full-information about the state, V (Wt), corresponding to
the recursive utility model (1), takes the following form:
V (At) = ΦA
1−γ
t , (8)
11Note that a unitary marginal propensity to consume and a constant optimal fraction invested in the risky asset
are valid not only for CRRA expected utility but also for Epstein-Zin recursive utility when the return to equity is
iid. See Appendices in Giovannini and Weil (1989) and Campbell and Viceira (1999) for detailed deviations.
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where Φ is a coefficient determined by the model parameters. Now we assume that the agents
cannot observe the true state. In this case, we approximate the value function around the perceived
value for the true state variable (at = lnAt), ât, as follows
V = Φ exp ((1− γ) at)
∼= V̂ + Φ
[
(1− γ) exp ((1− γ) ât) (at − ât) + 1
2
(1− γ)2 exp ((1− γ) ât) (at − ât)2
]
,
where V̂ = Φ exp ((1− γ) ât). Note that this Taylor approximation is accurate when 1 − γ is
close to 0.12 Therefore, minimizing the expected welfare loss due to imperfect observations,
Et
[
(at − ât)2
]
, is equivalent to minimizing
min
ât
Et
[
(at − ât)2
]
. (9)
In other words, when the approximation is accurate, the best estimate of the true state, ât, should
be its conditional mean based on the available information, Et [at]. In the next subsection, we use
the RI hypothesis proposed by Sims (2003) to rationalize the imperfect-state-observation setting.
3.1 Introducing RI
Following Sims (2003), we introduce rational inattention (RI) into the otherwise standard in-
tertemporal portfolio choice model by assuming consumers/investors face information-processing
constraints and have only finite Shannon channel capacity to observe the state of the world.
Specifically, we use the concept of entropy from information theory to characterize the uncer-
tainty about a random variable; the reduction in entropy is thus a natural measure of information
flow. Formally, entropy is defined as the expectation of the negative of the log of the density
function, −E [log (f (X))]. For example, the entropy of a discrete distribution with equal weight
on two points is simply E [log2 (f (X))] = −0.5 log2 (0.5) − 0.5 log2 (0.5) = 1, and the unit of
information contained in this distributed is one “bit”.13 In this case, an agent can remove all
uncertainty about X if the capacity devoted to monitoring X is κ = 1 bit.
With finite capacity κ ∈ (0,∞) , the true state a (a continuous variable) cannot be observed
without error; thus the information set at time t+ 1, mathcalIt+1, is generated by the entire his-
tory of noisy signals
{
a∗j
}t+1
j=0
. Following Sims (2003), we assume in this paper that the noisy signal
takes the additive form: a∗t+1 = at+1 + ξt+1, where ξt+1 is the endogenous noise caused by finite
12In our numerical exercises below, we restrict γ to be less than 1.01. When γ = 1.01 the omitted third-order
expansion, (a− â)3, is less than 1% of the size of the second-order expansion, (a− â)2.
13For alternative bases for the logarithm, the unit of information differs: with natural log the unit of information
is the ’nat’ and with base 10 it is a ’hartley.’
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capacity. We further assume that ξt+1 is an iid idiosyncratic shock and is independent of the fun-
damental shock. Note that the reason that the RI-induced noise is idiosyncratic is that the endoge-
nous noise arises from the consumer’s own internal information-processing constraint. Investors
with finite channel capacity will choose a new signal a∗t+1 ∈ mathcalIt+1 =
{
a∗1, a∗2, · · ·, a∗t+1
}
that
reduces the uncertainty about the state variable at+1 as much as possible. Formally, this idea can
be described by the information constraint
H (at+1|It)−H (at+1|It+1) = κ, (10)
where κ is the investor’s information channel capacity, H (at+1|It) denotes the entropy of the state
prior to observing the new signal at t + 1, and H (at+1|It+1) is the entropy after observing the
new signal. κ imposes an upper bound on the amount of information – that is, the change in the
entropy – that can be transmitted in any given period. We assume that the noise ξt+1 is Gaussian.
Finally, following the literature, we suppose that the ex ante at+1 is a Gaussian random variable.
As shown in Sims (2003), the optimal posterior distribution for at+1 will also be Gaussian given
the quadratic loss function specification, (9). Furthermore, we assume that all individuals in the
model economy have the same channel capacity; hence the average capacity in the economy is
equal to individual capacity.14 In this case the effective state variable is not the traditional state
variable (the wealth level at), but rather the so-called information state: the distribution of the
state variable at conditional on the information set available at time t, It.
As noted earlier, ex post Gaussian uncertainty is optimal:
at+1|It+1 ∼ N (ât+1,Σt+1) , (11)
where ât+1 = E [at+1|It+1] and Σt+1 =var [at+1|It+1] are the conditional mean and variance of
at+1, respectively. The information constraint (10) can thus be reduced to
1
2
(log (Ψt)− log (Σt+1)) = κ (12)
where Σt+1 = vart+1 [at+1] and Ψt = vart [at+1] are the posterior and prior variance, respectively.
Given a finite transmission capacity of κ bits per time unit, the optimizing consumer chooses a
signal that reduces the conditional variance by 12 (log (Ψt)− log (Σt+1)).15 In the univariate state
14Assuming that channel capacity follows some distribution in the cross-section complicates the problem when
aggregating, but would not change the main findings.
15Note that given Σt, choosing Σt+1 is equivalent to choosing the noise var [ξt], since the usual updating formula
for the variance of a Gaussian distribution is
Σt+1 = Ψt − Ψt (Ψt + var [ξt])−1 Ψt
where Ψt is the ex ante variance of the state and is a function of Σt.
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case this information constraint completes the characterization of the optimization problem and
everything can be solved analytically.16
The intertemporal budget constraint (5) then implies that
Et [at+1] = Et [rp,t+1] + ψ + ât, (13)
vart [at+1] = vart [rp,t+1] +
(
1
φ
)2
Σt. (14)
Substituting (13) into (12) yields
κ =
1
2
[
log
(
vart (rp,t+1) +
(
1
φ
)2
Σt
)
− log (Σt+1)
]
, (15)
which has a unique steady state Σ =
vart[rp,t+1]
exp(2κ)−(1/φ)2 with vart [rp,t+1] = α
2ω2. Note that here φ is
close to β as both γ and σ are close to 1.
The separation principle applies to this problem.17 Hence, the optimal consumption rule is
ct = b0 + ât (16)
and the perceived state ât evolves according to the following equation:
ât+1 =
1
φ
ât +
(
1− 1
φ
)
c∗t + ψ + ηt+1, (17)
where ηt+1 is the innovation to the perceived state:
ηt+1 = θ (rp,t+1 + ξt+1) +
θ
φ
(at − ât) , (18)
at − ât is the estimation error:
at − ât = (1− θ) rp,t+1
1− ((1− θ)/φ) · L −
θξt
1− ((1− θ)/φ) · L. (19)
θ = 1 − 1/ exp (2κ) is the optimal weight on a new observation, ξt+1 is the iid Gaussian noise
with E [ξt+1] = 0 and var [ξt+1] = Σ/θ, and a
∗
t+1 = at+1 + ξt+1 is the observed signal. (See Online
Appendix 6.1.)
Before moving on, we want to comment briefly on the decision rule of an agent with rational
inattention. An agent with RI chooses a joint distribution of states and controls, subject to the
16With more than one state variable, there is an additional constraint that requires the difference between the
prior and the posterior variance-covariance matrices be positive semidefinite; the resulting optimal posterior cannot
be characterized analytically, and generally poses significant numerical challenges as well. See Sims (2003) for some
examples.
17This principle says that under the LQ assumption optimal control and state estimation can be decoupled.
10
information-processing constraint and some fixed prior distribution over the state; with κ = ∞
this distribution is degenerate, but with κ < ∞ it is generally nontrivial. The noise terms ξt
can be viewed in the following manner: the investor instructs nature to choose consumption
in the current period from a certain joint distribution of consumption and current and future
permanent income, and then nature selects at random from that distribution (conditioned on the
true current permanent income that the agent cannot observe). Thus, an observed signal about
future permanent income a∗t+1 is equivalent to making the signal current consumption.
We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1:
2κ > log (1/φ) . (20)
Equation (20) ensures that agents have sufficient information-processing ability to “zero out”
the unstable root in the Euler equation. It will also ensure that certain infinite sums converge.
Note that using the definition of θ we can write this restriction as 1 − θ < φ2 < φ; the second
inequality arises because φ < 1. (Note that φ = βσ when γ is close to 1.) Note that along the
optimal path, financial wealth (At), savings (At−Ct), perceived financial wealth
(
Ât = exp (ât)
)
,
and consumption (Ct) are strictly positive. Given that limCt→0 u′ (Ct) =∞, the investor chooses
optimal consumption-savings and portfolio rules to ensure strictly positive consumption next
period; that is, we must have At+1 > 0 and At −Ct > 0
(
i.e., At − (1− β) Ât > 0
)
, to guarantee
that the logarithm of these objects is well-defined.
The following example is illustrative. An inattentive investor does not have perfect infor-
mation about his banking account. He knows that he has about $1000 in the account but he
does not know the exact amount (say $1010.00). He has already made a decision to purchase
a sofa in a furniture store; when he uses his debit card to check out, he finds that the price of
the sofa (say $1099.99) exceeds the amount of money in his account. He must then choose a less
expensive sofa (say $999) such that consumption is always less than his wealth. In effect, the
consumer constrains nature from choosing points from the joint distribution that imply negative
consumption at any future date.
Combining (5), (16), and (17) gives the expression for individual consumption growth:
∆ct+1 = θ
{
αut+1
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L +
[
ξt+1 − (θ/φ) ξt
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
]}
, (21)
where L is the lag operator.18 Note that all the above dynamics for consumption, perceived state,
and the change in consumption are not the final solutions because the optimal share invested in
stock market α has yet to be determined. To determine the optimal allocation in risky assets,
18Note that φ = βσ when γ is close to 1.
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we have to use an intertemporal optimality condition. However, the standard Euler equation is
not suitable for determining the optimal asset allocation in the RI economy because consumption
adjusts slowly and incompletely, making the relevant intertemporal condition one that equates the
marginal utility of consumption today to the covariance between marginal utility and the asset
return arbitrarily far into the future; that is, it is the “long-run Euler equation” that determines
optimal consumption/savings plans. We now turn to deriving this equation.
3.2 Long-run Risk and the Demand for the Risky Asset
Bansal and Yaron (2004), Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2006), Parker (2001, 2003) and Parker and
Julliard (2005) argue that long-term risk is a better measure of the true risk of the stock market if
consumption reacts with delay to changes in wealth; the contemporaneous covariance of consump-
tion and wealth understates the risk of equity.19 Long-term consumption risk is the appropriate
measure for the RI model.
Following Parker (2001, 2003), we define the long-term consumption risk as the covariance
of asset returns and consumption growth over the period of the return and many subsequent
periods. Because the RI model predicts that consumption reacts to the innovations to asset
returns gradually and incompletely, it can rationalize the conclusion in Parker (2001, 2003) that
consumption risk is long term instead of contemporaneous. Given the above analytical solution
for consumption growth, it is straightforward to calculate the ultimate consumption risk in the
RI model. Specifically, when agents behave optimally but only have finite channel capacity, we
have the following equality for the risky asset e and the risk free asset f :
Et
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S (Re,t+1 −Rf )
]
= 0, (22)
where Ui,t for any t denotes the derivative of the aggregate function with respect to its ith argument
evaluated at (Ct, Et [Ut+1]).
20 Note that with time additive expected utility, the discount factor
19Bansal and Yaron (2004) also document that consumption and dividend growth rates contain a long-run com-
ponent. An adverse change in the long-run component will lower asset prices and thus makes holding equity very
risky for investors.
20This long-term Euler equation can be obtained by combining the standard Euler equation for the excess return
Et [U1,t+1 (Re,t+1 −Rf )] = 0
with the Euler equation for the riskless asset between t+ 1 and t+ 1 + S,
U1,t+1 = Et+1
[
(βt+1 · · · βt+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S
]
, (23)
where βt+1+j = U2,t+1+j , for j = 0, · · ·, S. In other words, the equality can be obtained by using S + 1 period
consumption growth to price a multiperiod return formed by investing in equity for one period and then transforming
to the risk free asset for the next S periods. See Appendix 6.2 for detailed derivations.
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U2,t+1+j is constant and equal to β. (22) implies that the expected excess return can be written
as
Et [Re,t+1 −Rf ] = −
cov t
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S , Re,t+1 −Rf
]
Et
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S
] ,
so that
µ− rf + 1
2
ω2 = cov t
ρ
σ
 S∑
j=0
∆ct+1+j
+ (1− ρ)
 S∑
j=0
rp,t+1+j
 , ut+1
 , (24)
where we have used γ ' 1, ct+1+S − ct =
∑S
j=0 ∆ct+1+j , and ∆ct+1+j as given by (21). Further-
more, since the horizon S over which consumption responds completely to income shocks under
RI is infinite, the right hand side of (24) can be written as
lim
S→∞

S∑
j=0
cov t
ρ
σ
∆ct+1+j + (1− ρ)
 S∑
j=0
rp,t+1+j
 , ut+1
 = α(ρσ ς + 1− ρ)ω2. (25)
ς is the ultimate consumption risk measuring the accumulated effect of the equity shock to con-
sumption under RI:
ς = θ
∞∑
i=0
(
1− θ
φ
)i
=
θ
1− (1− θ) /φ > 1 (26)
when Assumption 1 holds.
3.3 Optimal Consumption and Asset Allocation
Combining Equations (16), (24), with (25) gives us optimal consumption and portfolio rules under
RI. The following proposition gives a complete characterization of the model’s solution for optimal
consumption and portfolio choice.
Proposition 1 Suppose that γ is close to 1 and Assumption 1 is satisfied. The optimal share
invested in the risky asset is
α∗ =
(ρ
σ
ς + 1− ρ
)−1 µ− rf + 0.5ω2
γω2
. (27)
The consumption function is
c∗t = log (1− φ) + ât, (28)
actual wealth evolves according to
at+1 =
1
φ
at +
(
1− 1
φ
)
c∗t + ψ +
[
α∗
(
ret+1 − rf
)
+ rf +
1
2
α∗ (1− α∗)ω2
]
, (29)
13
and estimated wealth ât is characterized by the following Kalman filtering equation
ât+1 =
1
φ
ât +
(
1− 1
φ
)
c∗t + ψ + ηt+1, (30)
where ηt+1 is defined in (18), ψ = log (φ)− (1− 1/φ) log (1− φ), θ = 1− exp (−2κ) is the optimal
weight on a new observation, ξt is an iid idiosyncratic noise shock with ω
2
ξ = var [ξt+1] = Σ/θ, and
Σ = α
∗2ω2
exp(2κ)−(1/φ)2 is the steady state conditional variance. The change in individual consumption
is
∆c∗t+1 = θ
{
α∗ut+1
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L +
[
ξt+1 − (θ/φ) ξt
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
]}
. (31)
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
The proposition clearly shows that optimal consumption and portfolio rules are interdependent
under RI. Expression (27) shows that although the optimal fraction of savings invested in the risky
asset is proportional to the risk premium (µ − rf + 0.5ω2), the reciprocal of both the coefficient
of relative risk aversion (γ), and the variance of the unexpected component in the risky asset
(ω2), as predicted by the standard Merton solution, it also depends on the interaction of RI and
RU measured by ρσ ς + 1 − ρ. We now examine how the interplay of RI and the preference for
the timing of uncertainty resolution affects the long-term consumption risk and the optimal share
invested in the risky asset. Denote ρσ ς + 1− ρ in (27) the long-run consumption risk, and rewrite
it as
ρ
σ
ς + 1− ρ = γ + Γ, (32)
where
Γ =
γ − 1
1− σ (ς − 1) (33)
measures how the interaction of recursive utility
(
γ−1
1−σ
)
and the long-run impact of the equity
return on consumption under RI (ς) affect the risk facing the inattentive investors. Expression
(32) clearly shows that both risk aversion (γ) and Γ determine the optimal share invested in the
risky asset. Specifically, suppose that investors prefer early resolution of uncertainty: γ > σ;
even a small deviation from infinite information-processing capacity due to RI will generate large
increases in long-run consumption risk and then reduce the demand for the risky asset.21 In fact,
it is not the scale of the deviation from σ = γ = 1 that matters, but the relative size of the
deviations from σ = 1 and γ = 1.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how RI affects the long-run consumption risk Γ when σ is close to
1 (here we set it to be 0.99999); following Viceira 2001 and Luo 2010, we set β = 0.91. The
21That is, θ is very close to 100% and therefore ς is only slightly greater than 1.
14
figures show that the interaction of RI and RU can significantly increase the long-run consumption
risk facing the investors. In particular, it is obvious that even if θ is high (so that investors can
process nearly all the information about the equity return), the long-run consumption risk is still
non-trivial. For example, when γ = 1.01 and θ = 0.9 (i.e., 90 percent of the uncertainty about
the equity return can be removed upon receiving the new signal), Γ = 11; if θ is reduced to 0.8,
Γ = 25. That is, a small difference between risk aversion γ and intertemporal substitution σ has
a significant impact on optimal portfolio rule.
Note that Expression (27) can be rewritten as
α∗ =
µ− rf + 0.5ω2
γ˜ω2
, (34)
where γ˜ = γ
( ρ
σ ς + 1− ρ
)
is the effective coefficient of relative risk aversion.22 When θ = 1, ς = 1
and optimal portfolio choice (27) under RI reduces to (7) in the standard RU case, which we have
discussed previously. Similarly, when ρ = 1 (27) reduces to the optimal solution in the expected
utility model discussed in Luo (2010). Later we will show that γ˜ could be significantly greater
than the true coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ). In other words, even if the true γ is close to 1
as assumed at the beginning of this section, the effective risk aversion that matters for the optimal
asset allocation is γ + Γ, which will be greater than 1 if the capacity is low and (γ − 1) is greater
than (1− σ) (indeed, it can be a lot larger even for small deviations from γ = σ = 1). Therefore,
both the degree of attention (θ) and the discount factor (β) amount to an increase in the effective
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Holding β constant, the larger the degree of attention, the less
the ultimate consumption risk. As a result, investors with low attention will choose to invest less
in the risky asset. For example, with RI, a 1 percent negative shock in investors’ financial wealth
would affect their consumption more than that predicted by the standard RE model. Therefore,
investors with finite capacity are less willing to invest in the risky asset.23
As argued in Campbell and Viceira (2002), the effective investment horizon of investors can
be measured by the discount factor β. In the standard full-information RE portfolio choice model
(such as Merton 1969), the investment horizon measured by β is irrelevant for investors who have
power utility functions, have only financial wealth, and face constant investment opportunities.
In contrast, it is clear from (26) and (27) that the investment horizon measured by β does
matter for optimal asset allocations under RU and RI because it affects the valuation of long-
term consumption risk. Expression (27) shows that the higher the value of β (the longer the
22By effective, we mean that if we observed a household’s behavior and interpreted it as coming from an individual
with unlimited information-processing ability, γ˜ would be our estimate of the risk aversion coefficient.
23Luo (2010) shows that with heterogeneous channel capacity the standard RI model would predict some agents
would not participate in the equity market at all. It is clear that the same result would obtain with recursive utility.
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investment horizon), the higher the fraction of financial wealth invested in the risky asset. Figure
3 illustrates how the investment horizon affects the long-run consumption risk Γ when γ = 1.01,
σ = 0.99999, θ = 0.8, and β = 0.91. The figure shows that the investment horizon can significantly
affect the long-run consumption risk facing the investors. For example, when β = 0.91, Γ = 25; if
β is increased to 0.93, Γ = 19. That is, a small reduction in the discount factor has a significant
effect on long-run consumption risk and the optimal portfolio share when combined with RI.
Given RRA (γ), IES (σ), and β, we can calibrate θ using the share of wealth held in risky
assets. Specifically, we start with the annualized US quarterly data in Campbell (2003), and
assume that ω = 0.16, pi = µ − rf = 0.06, β = 0.91, σ = 0.99999, and γ = 1.001. We then
calibrate θ to match the observed α = 0.22 estimated in Section 5.1 of Gabaix and Laibson (1999)
to obtain
α∗ =
[
γ +
γ − 1
1− σ (ς − 1)
]−1 pi + 0.5ω2
γω2
= 0.22, (35)
which means that θ = 0.48.24 That is, approximately 48 percent of the uncertainty is removed
upon receiving a new signal about the equity return. Note that if γ = 1, the RE version of the
model generates a highly unrealistic share invested in the stock market: α = pi+0.5ω
2
ω2
= 2.84. To
match the observed fraction in the US economy (0.22), γ must be set to 13.
Equation (31) shows that individual consumption under RI reacts not only to fundamental
shocks (ut+1) but also to the endogenous noise (ξt+1) induced by finite capacity. The endogenous
noise can be regarded as a type of “consumption shock” or “demand shock”. In the intertemporal
consumption literature, some transitory consumption shocks are often used to make the model fit
the data better. Under RI, the idiosyncratic noise due to RI provides a theory for these transi-
tory consumption movements. Furthermore, Equation (31) also makes it clear that consumption
growth adjusts slowly and incompletely to the innovations to asset returns but reacts quickly to
the idiosyncratic noise.
Using (31), we can obtain the stochastic properties of the joint dynamics of consumption
and the equity return. The following proposition summarizes the major stochastic properties of
consumption and the equity return.
Proposition 2 Given finite capacity κ (i.e., θ) and optimal portfolio choice α∗, the volatility of
consumption growth is
var [∆c∗t ] =
θα∗2
1− (1− θ) /φ2ω
2, (36)
24Gabaix and Laibson (2001) assume that all capital is stock market capital and that capital income accounts
for 1/3 of total income.
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the relative volatility of consumption growth to the equity return is
µ =
sd [∆c∗t ]
sd [ut]
=
√
θ
1− (1− θ) /φ2α
∗, (37)
the first-order autocorrelation of consumption growth is
ρ∆c(1) = corr
[
∆c∗t ,∆c
∗
t+1
]
= 0, (38)
and the contemporaneous correlation between consumption growth and the equity return is
corr
[
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
]
=
√
θ (1− (1− θ) /φ2). (39)
Proof. See Online Appendix 6.3.
Expression (37) shows that RI affects the relative volatility of consumption growth to the
equity return via two channels: (i) θ
1−(1−θ)/φ2 and (ii) α
∗. Holding the optimal share invested in
the risky asset α∗ fixed, RI increases the relative volatility of consumption growth via the first
channel because ∂
(
θα∗2
1−(1−θ)/φ2
)
/∂θ < 0. (31) indicates that RI has two effects on the volatility
of ∆c: the gradual response to a fundamental shock and the presence of the RI-induced noise
shocks. The former effect reduces consumption volatility, whereas the latter one increases it; the
net effect is that RI increases the volatility of consumption growth holding α∗ fixed. Furthermore,
as shown above, RI reduces α∗ as it increases the long-run consumption risk via the interaction
with the RU preference, which tends to reduce the volatility of consumption growth as households
switch to safer portfolios. Figure 4 illustrates how RI affects the relative volatility of consumption
to the equity return for different values of β in the RU model; for the parameters selected RI
reduces the volatility of consumption growth in the presence of optimal portfolio choice.
Expression (38) means that there is no persistence in consumption growth under RI. The
intuition of this result is as follows. Both MA(∞) terms in (31) affect consumption persistence
under RI. Specifically, in the absence of the endogenous noises, the gradual response to the shock to
the equity return due to RI leads to positive persistence in consumption growth: ρ∆c(1) =
θ(1−θ)
φ >
0. (See Appendix 6.3.) The presence of the noises generate negative persistence in consumption
growth, exactly offsetting the positive effect of the gradual response to the fundamental shock
under RI.
Expression (39) shows that RI reduces the contemporaneous correlation between consumption
growth and the equity return because ∂ corr
(
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
)
/∂θ > 0. Figure 5 illustrates the effects
of RI on the correlation when β = 0.91. It clearly shows that the correlation between consumption
growth and the equity return is increasing with the degree of attention (θ).
If the model economy consists of a continuum of consumers with identical capacity, we need
to consider how to aggregate the decision rules across all consumers facing the idiosyncratic noise
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shock. Sun (2006) presents an exact law of large numbers for this type of economic models and
then characterizes the cancellation of individual risk via aggregation. In this model, we adopt
this law of large numbers (LLN) and assume that the initial cross-sectional distribution of the
noise shock is its stationary distribution. Provided that we construct the space of agents and the
probability space appropriately, all idiosyncratic noises are canceled out and aggregate noise is
zero. Specifically, after aggregating over all consumers, we obtain the expressions for changes in
aggregate consumption:
∆c∗t+1 =
θα∗ut+1
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L. (40)
where the iid idiosyncratic noises in the expressions for individual consumption dynamics have
been canceled out. The following proposition summarizes the results of the joint dynamics of
aggregate consumption and the equity return:
Proposition 3 Given finite capacity κ (i.e., θ) and optimal portfolio choice α∗, the relative
volatility of consumption growth to the equity return is
µ =
sd [∆c∗t ]
sd [ut]
=
√
θ2
1− (1− θ) /φ2α
∗, (41)
the first-order autocorrelation of consumption growth is
ρ∆c(1) = corr
[
∆c∗t ,∆c
∗
t+1
]
=
θ (1− θ)
φ
, (42)
and the contemporaneous correlation between consumption growth and the equity return is
corr
[
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
]
=
√
(1− (1− θ) /φ2). (43)
Proof. See Online Appendix 6.3.
3.4 Channel Capacity
Our required channel capacity (θ = 0.48 or κ = 0.33 nats) may seem low; 1 nat of information
transmitted is definitely well below the total information-processing ability of human beings.25
However, it is not implausible for little capacity to be allocated to the portfolio decision because
individuals also face many other competing demands on their attention. For an extreme case, a
young worker who accumulates balances in his 401 (k) retirement savings account might pay no at-
tention to the behavior of the stock market until he retires. In addition, in our model for simplicity
we only consider an aggregate shock from the equity return, while in reality consumers/investors
25See Landauer (1986) for an estimate.
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face substantial idiosyncratic shocks (in particular labor income shocks) that we do not model in
this paper; Sims (2010) contains a more extensive discussion of low information-processing limits
in the context of economic models.
As we noted in the Introduction, there are some existing estimation and calibration results
in the literature, albeit of an indirect nature. For example, Adam (2005) found θ = 0.4 based
on the response of aggregate output to monetary policy shocks; Luo (2008) found that if θ =
0.5, the otherwise standard permanent income model can generate realistic relative volatility of
consumption to labor income; Luo and Young (2009) found that setting θ = 0.57 allows a otherwise
standard RBC model to match the post-war US consumption/output volatility. Finally, Melosi
(2009) uses a model of firm rational inattention (similar to Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt 2009) and
estimates it to match the dynamics of output and inflation, obtaining θ = 0.66. Thus, it seems
that somewhere between 0.4 and 0.7 is a reasonable range, and our number lies right in the middle
of this interval while the one required in Luo (2010) is much lower.
3.5 Implications for Equilibrium Asset Pricing
According to the standard consumption-based capital asset pricing theory (CCAPM), the ex-
pected excess return on any risky portfolio over the risk-free interest rate is determined by the
covariance of the excess return with contemporaneous consumption growth and the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. Given the observed low contemporaneous covariance between equity returns
and contemporaneous consumption growth, the standard CCAPM theory predicts that equities
are not very risky. Consequently, to generate the observed high equity premium (measured by the
difference between the average real stock return and the average short-term real interest rate),
the coefficient of relative risk aversion must be very high. Given that ω = 0.16, pi = µ−rf = 0.06,
and cov
[
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
]
= 6×10−4 (annualized US quarterly data from Campbell 2003), to generate
the observed equity premium we need a risk aversion coefficient of γ = 100.
To explore the equilibrium asset pricing implications of the optimal consumption and portfolio
rules under RU and RI derived in Section 3.3, we now consider a simple exchange economy in the
vein of Lucas (1978) and Hansen (1987). Specifically, we assume that the representative agent
receives an endowment, which equals consumption in equilibrium and can trade two assets in the
economy: a risky asset entitling the consumer to the dividend (i.e., endowment) and a riskless
asset (an inside bond, i.e., in equilibrium its net supply is 0). The returns to the assets then adjust
to support a no-trade equilibrium. Using the optimal consumption and portfolio rules under RU
and RI derived in the above partial equilibrium model, we can then explore how the interaction of
RU and RI affects the equilibrium equity premium. The following is the definition of the RU-RI
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equilibrium in our model economy:
Definition 4 The RU-RI equilibrium consists of (i) the portfolio rule α∗, (27), (ii) the consump-
tion rule c∗, (28), and (iii) the perceived state (ŝ) evolution equation, (30) such that simultane-
ously,
(1) Markets clear in each period: c∗ is just the endowment and α∗ = 1;
(2) The consumer solves for α∗ and c∗ using the RU-RI model specified in Sections 3.1-3.3.
The following proposition summarizes the implications of the interaction of RU and RI for the
equity premium in the general equilibrium defined above:
Proposition 5 Given finite capacity κ (i.e., θ), the equilibrium equity premium, pi, is given by:
pi = (γ + Γ)ω2, (44)
where Γ = γ−11−σ (ς − 1) and ς = θ1−(1−θ)/β > 1.
Proof. (44) can be obtained by setting α∗ in (27) to be 1.
It is clear from (44) that the interaction between RI and RU induces a higher equity premium
because risk aversion and intertemporal substitution are disentangled and the accumulated effect
of the innovation to the equity on consumption ς = θ1−(1−θ)/φ > 1. The intuition behind this result
is that for inattentive investors the uncertainty about consumption changes induced by changes
in the equity return takes many periods to be resolved and this postponement is distasteful for
these investors who prefer early uncertainty resolution; consequently, they require higher risk
compensation in equilibrium.
Figures 1 and 2 can be used again to illustrate how RI affects the equity premium in equilibrium
via increasing the long-run consumption risk Γ when β = 0.91 and both γ and σ are close to 1.
Using the same example in the portfolio choice problem, when γ = 1.01 and θ = 0.9, Γ = 11,
which means that the required equity premium would be increased by 11 times; when θ is smaller
Γ is larger, as we showed earlier, so the required return must be larger. That is, a small difference
between risk aversion γ and intertemporal substitution σ can have a significant impact on the
equilibrium equity return if agents have limited attention.
Table 1 reports how RI affects the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and the equity
return and the equilibrium equity premium in the RU model. There are two interesting observa-
tions in the table. First, inattention governed by low θ can significantly increase the equilibrium
equity return by interacting with the preference for early uncertainty resolution. For example,
when θ = 25%, γ = 1.01, and σ = 0.998, the equilibrium equity premium is about 7.3%. Second,
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lowering attention can simultaneously improve the joint dynamics of aggregate consumption and
the equity premium. Specifically, RI can (i) reduce the relative volatility of consumption growth
to the equity return, (ii) generate positive autocorrelation of consumption growth, and (iii) reduce
the contemporaneous correlation between consumption growth and the equity return. From the
table, it is clear that it is difficult to generate the observed relative volatility of consumption
growth in the equilibrium model. The reason is that we are considering a pure exchange economy
where the share invested in the risky asset is 100% in equilibrium, which significantly increases
consumption volatility. In addition, from (41)-(43) and (44), we can see that the value of EIS
only affects the equilibrium equity premium and does not affect the consumption.
3.6 Comparison of Portfolio Choice and Asset Pricing under Alternative Hy-
potheses
3.6.1 Model Uncertainty and Robustness
Robust control and filtering emerged in the engineering literature in the 1970s, and was introduced
into economics and further developed by Hansen, Sargent, and others. A simple version of robust
optimal control considers such a question: How to make decisions when the agent does not know
the probability model that generates the data? The agent with the preference for robustness
considers a range of models, and makes decisions that maximize utility given the worst possible
model. The work of Uppal and Wang (2003) and Maenhout (2004) explores how model uncertainty
due to a preference for robustness affects optimal portfolio choice. In particular, Maenhout (2004)
shows that robustness leads to environment-specific effective risk aversion and thus significantly
reduces the demand for the risky asset. In addition, after calibrating the robustness parameter,
he finds that robustness increases the equilibrium equity premium.26 In his model, the optimal
portfolio rule is
α =
pi
(γ + ϑ)ω2
,
where ϑ measures the degree of robustness and γ + ϑ is the effective coefficient of relative risk
aversion. Compared with the portfolio rule derived in our RU-RI model, it is clear that although
both of these two specifications, model uncertainty due to robustness and state uncertainty due to
inattention, can reduce the optimal share invested in the risky asset, the mechanisms to generate
low allocation in the risky asset are distinct: In the former, the aversion to model uncertainty
increases the effective degree of risk aversion, and thus reduces the optimal allocation in the equity,
26Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) and Abel (2002) examine how exogenously distorting subjective beliefs can
help resolve the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle; robust control distorts beliefs in exactly the
right manner.
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whereas in the latter the interaction of rational inattention and a preference for early resolution
of uncertainty strengthens long-run consumption risk and thus reduce the optimal share in the
equity.
3.6.2 Infrequent Adjustment
Another closely related hypothesis about informational frictions is the infrequent adjustment
specification. (See Lynch 1996; Gabaix and Laibson 1999; Abel, Eberly, Panageas, 2007; and
Nechio 2012 for discussions of the implications of infrequent adjustment in consumption on port-
folio choice or/and asset pricing.) Among these models, Gabaix and Laibson (1999)’s 6D bias
model is most related to our work. Particularly, the key difference between Gabaix and Laibson’s
infrequent-adjustment model and our RI model is that in their model, investors adjust their con-
sumption plans infrequently but completely once they choose to adjust, whereas investors with
finite capacity adjust their plans frequently but incompletely in every period. In addition, in the
6D model, the optimal fraction of savings invested in the risky asset is assumed to be fixed at the
standard Merton solution
α =
pi
γω2
,
where pi is the equity premium, γ is CRRA, and ω2 is the variance of the equity return, whereas
optimal portfolio choice under RI reflects the larger long-term consumption risk caused by slow
adjustments and thus the share invested in the risky asset is less than the Merton solution.
Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007) derived a unique solution for the optimal interval of time
between consecutive observations of the value of the portfolio with observation and transaction
costs, and showed that even a small observation cost can lead to a substantial (eight-month)
decision interval. They assume that the investment portfolio of riskless bonds and risky stocks
is managed by a portfolio manager who continuously rebalances the portfolio, which is similar
to the assumption used in Gabaix and Laibson (1999). In other words, they do not examine
how infrequent adjustments affect the optimal asset allocation via the channel of the long-run
consumption risk. In all of these infrequent adjustments, aggregate consumption can have low
contemporaneous correlation with the equity return because individual investors adjust their
consumption plans infrequently and only a faction of the agents adjust their consumption in each
period.
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4 Two Extensions
4.0.3 Correlated Shock and Noise
In the above analysis, we assumed that the exogenous shock to the equity return and RI-induced
noise are uncorrelated. We now discuss how correlated shocks and noises affect the implications of
RI for long-run consumption risk and optimal asset allocation. In reality, we do observe correlated
shocks and noises. For example, if the system is an airplane and winds are buffeting the plane,
the random gusts of wind affect both the process (the airplane dynamics) and the measurement
(the sensed wind speed) if people use an anemometer to measure wind speed as an input to the
Kalman filter. In our model economy, it seems reasonable to assume that given the same level
of capacity, when the economy moves into a recession (or financial crisis), both the innovation to
the equity return and the noise due to finite capacity (the measurement or the perceived/sensed
signal) will also be affected by the recession. In the RI problem, the correlation generalizes the
assumption in Sims (2003) on the uncorrelated RI-induced noise.
Specifically, we consider the case in which the process shock (ε) and the noise (ξ) are correlated
as follows:
corr (εt+1, ξt+1) = ρuξ, (45)
cov (εt+1, ξt+1) = ρuξωωξ, (46)
where ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the correlation coefficient between εt+1 and ξt+1, and ω2ξ = var [ξt+1]. Substi-
tuting (45) and (46) into the pricing equation (24), we obtain
pi = lim
S→∞

S∑
j=0
cov t
ρ
σ
∆ct+1+j + (1− ρ)
 S∑
j=0
rp,t+1+j
 , ut+1
 = (γ + Γ)αω2,
where
Γ =
γ − 1
1− σ (ς − 1) +
ρρuξ
σ
(
1− 1
φ
ς
)√
θ
1/ (1− θ)− (1/φ)2 . (47)
measures the long-run consumption risk in the presence of the correlation between the equity
return and the noise. (See Appendix 6.4.) Figure 6 illustrates how RI affects the long-run
consumption risk Γ for different values of the correlation when β = 0.91, σ = 0.99999, and γ =
1.01. The figure clearly shows that the positive correlation will reduce the long-run consumption
risk and thus increase the optimal share invested in the risky asset. For example, when θ = 0.8
and ρuξ = 0.1, Γ = 20; if ρuξ reduces to −0.1, Γ = 31.
What is a reasonable sign for this correlation? If we assume that capacity is fixed when the
state of the economy changes, it seems more reasonable that ρuξ is positive because it would be
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more difficult to observe a more volatile economy given fixed capacity. However, if we relax the
assumption that κ is fixed, some capacity from other sources will be reallocated to monitor the
state of the economy to increase the economic efficiency because an increase in the underlying
uncertainty leads to larger marginal welfare losses due to RI. In this case, ρuξ could be negative
as the Kalman gain θ will increase with capacity κ.
4.1 Nontradable Labor Income
It is known that some of the anomalous predictions of the portfolio model can be reduced, although
not eliminated, by the introduction of nontradable labor income. Following Viceira (2001) and
Campbell and Viceira (2002), we assume that labor income Yt is uninsurable and nontradable in
the sense that investors cannot write claims against future labor income; thus, labor income can
be viewed as a dividend on the implicit holdings of human wealth. We will only sketch the results
here; formal derivations are a straightforward extension of our existing results and are omitted.
We assume that the process for labor income is
Yt+1 = Yt exp (νt+1 + g) (48)
where g is a deterministic growth rate and νt+1 is an iid normal random variable with mean
zero and variance ω2ν . Log labor income therefore follows a random walk with drift; to keep
the exposition simpler, we abstract from any transitory income shocks. In order to permit the
risky asset to play a hedging role against labor income risk, we suppose that the two shocks are
potentially correlated contemporaneously:
covt (ut+1, νt+1) = ωuν .
If ωuν = 0 then labor income can be viewed as purely idiosyncratic. The flow budget constraint
then becomes
At+1 = R
p
t+1 (At + Yt − Ct) (49)
Log-linearizing (49) around the long-run means of the log consumption-income ratio and the
log wealth-income ratio, c − y = E [ct − yt] and a − y = E [at − yt], and defining a new state
variable, st = at +λyt, where λ =
1−ρa+ρc
ρa−1 , we adopt the same solution method in our benchmark
model to solve this model with uninsurable labor income. The following proposition summarizes
the results on the optimal consumption and portfolio rules under RI:
Proposition 6 Suppose that γ is close to 1 and Assumption (2) is satisfied (see below). The
optimal share invested in the risky asset is
α∗ =
1
ς˜
[
1
b1
(
µ− rf + 0.5ω2
ω2
)
+
(
1− 1
b1
)
ς˜ωuν
ω2
]
, (50)
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where ς˜ = ρσ ς + 1 − ρ > 1, b1 = ρa−1ρc ∈ (0, 1], ρa =
exp(a−y)
1+exp(a−y)−exp(c−y) > 0, and ρc =
exp(c−y)
1+exp(a−y)−exp(c−y) > 0; the consumption function is
c∗t = b0 + b1ŝt; (51)
the true state evolution equation is
st+1 = ρ0 + ρast − ρcct − g + εt+1 + 1− ρa + ρc
ρa − 1 νt+1 + r
p
t+1, (52)
where ρ0 = − (1− ρa + ρc) log (1− ρa + ρc) − ρa log (ρa) + ρc log (ρc); and the estimated state ŝt
is characterized by the following Kalman filtering equation
ŝt+1 = (1− θ) ŝt + θ (st+1 + ξt+1) + Υ, (53)
where ψ = log (φ) − (1− 1/φ) log (1− φ), θ = 1 − 1exp(2κ) is the optimal weight on a new obser-
vation, ξt is an iid idiosyncratic noise shock with ω
2
ξ = var [ξt+1] = Σ/θ, Σ =
α∗2ω2
exp(2κ)−(1/φ)2 is the
steady state conditional variance, and Υ is an irrelevant constant term.
Proof. See Online Appendix 6.5.
Note that to obtain these results, we require the following assumption.
Assumption 2:
1− (1− θ) ρa > 0. (54)
Comparing with the assumption used in the benchmark model, here ρa has replaced β
−1, but
otherwise Equation (54) is the same as Equation (20). When ρ = 1 (or γ = 1/σ), the RU solution
reduces to the expected utility solution:
α∗ =
1
ς
[
1
b1
(
µ− rf + 0.5ω2
ω2
)
+
(
1− 1
b1
)
ςωuν
ω2
]
(55)
where ς = θ1−(1−θ)ρa > 1.
ς˜ > 1 measures the long-run (accumulated) impacts of financial shocks on consumption. It is
clear that our key result – that the presence of rational inattention combined with a preference
for early resolution of uncertainty will dramatically reduce the share of risky assets and increase
the required equity premium – survives the introduction of labor income risk. Expression 50
contains two components. The first part is the so-called speculative asset demand, driven by
the gap between the return to equity and the riskfree rate. Note that without labor income
risk, the optimal asset allocation is solely determined by the speculative demand; that is, the
allocation is proportional to the expected excess return of the risky asset, and is inversely related
to the variance of the equity return and to the elasticity of consumption to perceived wealth, b1.
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The second part is the hedging demand, governed by the correlation between returns and labor
income. Given that ρa > 1 and θ ∈ (0, 1), RI affects the optimal allocation in the risky asset via
the following two channels:
1. Reducing both the speculative demand and the income-hedging demand by the long-run
consumption risk parameter ς˜.
2. In addition, as shown in the second term in the bracket of (50), RI increases the income
hedging demand by ς˜ because ut and νt are correlated and consumption reacts to the shock
to total wealth ζt = αut + λνt gradually and indefinitely.
To make these points clear, we rewrite (50) as:
α∗ =
1
ς˜b1
(
µ− rf + 0.5ω2
ω2
)
+
(
1− 1
b1
)
ωuν
ω2
(56)
This expression clearly shows that RI increases the relative importance of the income-hedging
demand to the speculative demand via the long-run consumption risk ς˜; under RI, the ratio of
the income hedging demand to the speculative demand increases by ς˜. As inattention increases
(θ declines), the hedging aspect of the demand for risky assets increases in importance, since
∂ς˜
∂θ < 0. To see where this positive relationship derives from, results from Luo (2008) and Luo and
Young (2009b) imply that the welfare cost of labor income uncertainty is increasing in the degree
of inattention (as θ falls, the cost rises). If equity returns are positively correlated with labor
income, the agent will decrease demand for the asset as an insurance vehicle; similarly, a negative
correlation will increase hedging demand. The data suggest this correlation is negative, but so
small as to be quantitatively unimportant.27 In addition, the second term in (56) also shows that
RI has no effect on the absolute value of the income hedging demand. The reason is simple: under
RI the innovation to the equity return not only affects the amount of long-run consumption risk
measured by 1/ς but also affects the long-run correlation between the shocks to the equity return
and labor income measured by ςωuν as both shocks affect consumption growth; consequently, RI
does not change the hedging demand of labor income. It is clear from Expression (55) that ςs in
the term (1/ς) and in the term (ςωuν) are just cancelled out.
As in Section 3.5, we can examine the asset pricing implications of the twin assumptions of
recursive utility and rational inattention in the presence of nontradable labor income. Given that
every investor has the same degree of RI, the following pricing equation linking consumption
27For example, Heaton and Lucas (2000) find that individual labor income is weakly correlated with equity
returns, with support for both positive and negative correlations. Aggregate wages have a correlation of −0.07 with
equity returns.
26
growth and the equity premium holds when γ ' 1:
pi = α∗ς˜b1ω2 − ς˜ (b1 − 1)ωuν − 0.5ω2. (57)
Under the same assumptions made above (zero net supply of bonds so that α∗ = 1), (57) becomes
pi = ς˜
[
b1ω
2 + (1− b1)ωuν
]− 0.5ω2, (58)
which clearly shows that the positive correlation between the equity return and labor income,
ωuv > 0, increases the equilibrium equity premium. Specifically, the magnitude of the hedging
demand, (1− b1)ωuv, is increased by ς in the presence of information-processing constraints. In
sum, the interaction between RI and positive correlations between the equity return and labor
income will increase the equity premium in equilibrium by
$ = ς˜
[
1 +
(
1
b1
− 1
)
ρuvωων
ω2
]
. (59)
Note that in the case without RI and ρuv = 0, pi + 0.5ω
2 = b1ω
2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the portfolio choice of a household with Kreps-Porteus/Epstein-Zin
preferences and limited information-processing capacity (rational inattention). Rational inatten-
tion interacts with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty to generate significant decreases
in the demand for risky assets; small deviations from indifference over timing and infinite channel
capacity are magnified over the infinite future to produce empirically-reasonable portfolios with
actual risk aversion essentially equal to 1, whether the agent has nontradable labor income or
not. This result raises important questions about empirical assessment, such as how to identify
risk aversion separately from channel capacity, that we will not pursue here.
We have focused on solutions in which ex post uncertainty is Gaussian. Recent results in
the rational inattention literature (Matejka and Sims 2010 and Saint-Paul 2010) have noted that
there exist discrete optimal solutions to the decision problem, even in the LQ-Gaussian case, that
may dominate the Gaussian one; the intuition for this result is that information costs can be
reduced by dividing the state space into regions and only permitting solutions to differ across
these regions instead of inside them. With these solutions in mind, Batchuluun, Luo, and Young
(2008) show that fully-nonlinear portfolio decisions are discrete in a simple two-period economy;
these solutions have the property that agents will place positive measure on only a small number of
different portfolio shares. For reasonable degrees of risk aversion and low enough channel capacity,
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one group of these points involves zero equity holdings, because agents who want to borrow from
future income will do so using the risk-free asset and there is always a positive probability that
wealth is actually such that borrowing would be optimal. A second group of points involves a
small amount of risky assets (and generally this set of points has the most mass), while a third
group has a significant amount of risky assets. Extending these results to study portfolios in
long-horizon models has the potential to rationalize why few households hold assets that do not
appear very risky (in terms of consumption or utility), why those that hold these assets hold so
few of them, and why these assets pay such high rates of return. The mechanism identified here
will still be present, if somewhat obscured by the numerical solution.
6 Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
6.1 Deriving The Perceived State Evolution Equation
Here, we detail the straightforward steps omitted in the main part of the paper that derive the
perceived state evolution equation. The Kalman filtering equation can be written as:
ât+1 = (1− θ)
[
1
φ
ât +
(
1− 1
φ
)
ct
]
+ θa∗t+1. (60)
Combining this Kalman filtering equation with the true state evolution equation yields:
ât+1 =
1
φ
ât +
(
1− 1
φ
)
c∗t + ψ + ηt+1, (61)
where ηt+1 is the innovation to the perceived state:
ηt+1 = θ
[
α∗
(
ret+1 − rf
)
+ rf +
1
2
α∗ (1− α∗)ω2 + ξt+1
]
+
θ
φ
(at − ât) ,
and at − ât is the estimation error:
at − ât =
(1− θ) [α∗ (ret+1 − rf)+ rf + 12α∗ (1− α∗)ω2]
1− ((1− θ)/φ) · L −
θξt
1− ((1− θ)/φ) · L.
6.2 Deriving Long-term Euler Equation within the Recursive Utility Frame-
work
Within the recursive utility framework, when wealth is allocated efficiently across assets, the
marginal investment in any asset yields the same expected increase in future utility,
Et
[
U2,tU1,t+1
U1,t
(Re,t+1 −Rf )
]
= 0, (62)
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which means that
Et [U1,t+1 (Re,t+1 −Rf )] = 0, (63)
where Ui,t for any t denotes the derivative of the aggregator function with respect to its i − th
argument, evaluated at (Ct, Et [Ut+1]).
Using the Euler equation for the risk free asset between t+ 1 and t+ 1 + S,
U1,t+1 = Et+1
[
(βt+1 · · · βt+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S
]
= Et+1
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S
]
, (64)
where we denote βt+1+j = U2,t+j , for j = 0, · · ·, S. Substituting (64) into (63) yields
Et
[
Et+1
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S)
(
Rf
)S
U1,t+1+S
](
Ret+1 −Rf
)]
= Et
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S)
(
Rf
)S
U1,t+1+S
(
Ret+1 −Rf
)]
= 0.
Hence, the expected excess return can be written as
Et [Re,t+1 −Rf ] = −
cov t
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S , Re,t+1 −Rf
]
Et
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S
]
= −
cov t
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S , Re,t+1 −Rf
]
Et [U1,t+1]
= −
cov t
[
(U2,t+1 · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S U1,t+1+S , Re,t+1 −Rf
]
U1,t/ (U2,tRf )
= − cov t
[
(U2,t · · · U2,t+S) (Rf )S+1 U1,t+1+S
U1,t
, Re,t+1 −Rf
]
= − cov t
[(
RfU2,t
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
· · ·
(
RfU2,t+S
U1,t+1+S
U1,t+S
)
, Re,t+1 −Rf
]
' cov t
[(
θ
ρ
∆ct+1 + (1− θ) rp,t+1
)
+ · · ·+
(
θ
ρ
∆ct+1+S + (1− θ) rp,t+1+S
)
, ut+1
]
= cov t
θ
ρ
 S∑
j=0
∆ct+1+j
+ (1− θ)
 S∑
j=0
rp,t+1+S
 , ut+1
 .
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6.3 Deriving the Stochastic Properties of Consumption Dynamics
Taking unconditional variance on both sides of (31) yields
var [∆c∗t ] = θ
2
{
α∗2ω2
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2 +
[
1 +
θ2/β2
1− (1− θ)2 /β2
]
ω2ξ
}
= θ2
{
1
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2 +
[
1
(1− (1− θ) /φ2) θ −
1
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2
]}
α∗2ω2
=
θφ2
φ2 + θ − 1α
∗2ω2.
Note that in the absence of the endogenous noise shocks, we have
var [∆c∗t ] = θ
2 α
∗2ω2
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2
=
θ2
1− (1− θ) /φ2α
∗2ω2.
Using (31), we can compute the first-order autocovariance of consumption growth:
cov
(
∆c∗t ,∆c
∗
t+1
)
= cov
 θ{ α∗ut1−((1−θ)/φ)·L + [ξt − (θ/φ)ξt−11−((1−θ)/φ)·L]} ,
θ
{
α∗ut+1
1−((1−θ)/φ)·L +
[
ξt+1 − (θ/φ)ξt1−((1−θ)/φ)·L
]} 
=
1− θ
φ
cov
(
θα∗ut
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L,
θα∗ut
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
)
+ cov
(
θ
[
ξt − (θ/φ) ξt−1
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
]
,− θ (θ/φ) ξt
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
)
=
1− θ
φ
var
(
θα∗ut
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
)
+ cov
(
θ
[
ξt − (θ/φ) ξt−1
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
]
,− θ (θ/φ) ξt
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
)
=
1− θ
φ
(θα∗)2 ω2
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2 −
θ3
φ
α∗2ω2
(1/ (1− θ)− 1/φ2) θ
+
θ4 (1− θ)
φ3
1
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2
α∗2ω2
(1/ (1− θ)− 1/φ2) θ
=
 1−θφ θ21−(1−θ)2/φ2 − θ2φ 11/(1−θ)−1/φ2
+ θ
3(1−θ)
φ3
1
1−(1−θ)2/φ2
1
1/(1−θ)−1/φ2
α∗2ω2
= 0.
We thus have
corr
(
∆c∗t ,∆c
∗
t+1
)
=
cov
(
∆c∗t ,∆c∗t+1
)√
var (∆c∗t )
√
var
(
∆c∗t+1
) = 0.
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Note that in the absence of the endogenous noise shocks, we have
corr
(
∆c∗t ,∆c
∗
t+1
)
=
1− θ
φ
(θα∗)2 ω2
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2
(
θφ2
φ2 + θ − 1α
∗2ω2
)−1
=
1− θ
φ
θ2
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2
(
θ
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2
)−1
=
θ (1− θ)
φ
> 0
because
cov
(
∆c∗t ,∆c
∗
t+1
)
= cov
(
θα∗ut
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L,
θ ((1− θ) /φ)α∗ut
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
)
=
1− θ
φ
cov
(
θα∗ut
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L,
θα∗ut
1− ((1− θ) /φ) · L
)
=
1− θ
φ
(θα∗)2 ω2
1− (1− θ)2 /φ2 .
Finally, using (31), it is straightforward to show that
corr
(
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
)
=
cov
(
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
)
sd
(
∆c∗t+1
)
sd (ut+1)
=
θα∗ω2√
θφ2
φ2+θ−1α
∗ω2
=
√
θ (1− (1− θ) /φ2),
where we use the result that
cov
(
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
)
= cov (θα∗ut+1, ut+1) = θα∗ω2.
Note that in the absence of the endogenous noise shocks, we have
corr
(
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
)
=
√
(1− (1− θ) /φ2),
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6.4 Deriving the Long-run Risk in the Presence of the Correlation
Using (24), we have
pi = lim
S→∞

S∑
j=0
cov t
 ρσθ{ αut+1+j1−((1−θ)/φ)·L + [ξt+1+j − (θ/φ)ξt+j1−((1−θ)/φ)·L]}
+ (1− ρ)
(∑S
j=0 rp,t+1+j
)
, ut+1

=
ρ
σ
θ
{
1
1− (1− θ) /φαω
2 +
[
1− θ
φ
1
1− (1− θ) /φ
]
ρωωξ
}
+ (1− ρ)αω2
=
ρ
σ
θ
 11− (1− θ) /φ + ρuξ
[
1− θ
φ
1
1− (1− θ) /φ
]√√√√ 1[
1/ (1− θ)− (1/φ)2
]
θ
αω2 + (1− ρ)αω2
=

[
ρ
σ
θ
1− (1− θ) /φ + (1− ρ)
]
+
ρρuξ
σ
θ
[
1− θ
φ
1
1− (1− θ) /φ
]√√√√ 1[
1/ (1− θ)− (1/φ)2
]
θ
αω2,
which will reduce to (47) in the text. Note that here we use the fact that ωξ =
√
1
[exp(2κ)−(1/φ)2]θαω.
6.5 Deriving Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Rules in the Presence of
Uninsurable Labor Income
Log-linearizing the flow budget constraint, At+1 = R
p
t+1 (At + Yt − Ct), around the long-run
means of the log consumption-income ratio and the log wealth-income ratio, c − y = E [ct − yt]
and a− y = E [at − yt], yields the approximate budget constraint
at+1 − yt+1 = ρ0 + ρa (at − yt) + ρc (ct − yt)−∆yt+1 + rpt+1 (65)
where ρ, ρa, and ρc are constants:
ρa =
exp (a− y)
1 + exp (a− y)− exp (c− y) > 0 (66)
ρc =
exp (c− y)
1 + exp (a− y)− exp (c− y) > 0 (67)
ρ0 = − (1− ρa + ρc) log (1− ρa + ρc)− ρa log (ρa) + ρc log (ρc) . (68)
Starting from the standard time-separable rational expectations model (γ = σ and θ = 1) we
obtain the decision rules
ct = yt + b0 + b1 (at − yt)
α∗ =
1
b1
(
µ− rf + 12ω2
γω2
)
+
(
1− 1
b1
)
ωuν
ω2
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where
b1 =
ρa − 1
ρc
∈ (0, 1] (69)
b0 =
1
1− ρa
[(
1
γ
− b1
)
E
[
rpt+1
]
+
1
γ
log (β) +
Ξ
2γ
− ρ0 − (1− b1) g
]
;
b1 is the elasticity of consumption with respect to financial wealth, making 1 − b1 the elasticity
with respect to labor income, and Ξ is an irrelevant constant term. If labor income is tradable,
b1 = 1 and the model reduces to the one studied previously.
To introduce rational inattention, we define a new state variable
st = at + λyt, (70)
where
λ =
1− ρa + ρc
ρa − 1 .
(As we have noted earlier, multivariate rational inattention models are analytically intractable,
so the reduction of the state space to a single variable is critical for our results). Using this new
state variable, the log-linearized budget constraint (65) can be rewritten as
st+1 = ρ0 + ρast − ρcct − g + ρεεt+1 + λνt+1 + rpt+1. (71)
The consumption function then becomes
ct = b0 + b1st. (72)
Applying the separation principle yields
ct = b0 + b1ŝt (73)
and we obtain the law of motion for the conditional mean of permanent income
ŝt+1 = (1− θ) ŝt + θ (st+1 + ξt+1) + Υ, (74)
where Υ is an irrelevant constant and all other notation is the same as above.
Given the assumption that 1 − (1− θ) ρa > 0, applying the same long-term Euler equation
we used in the benchmark model, we can solve for the optimal share invested in equity in the
presence of labor income as:
α∗ =
1
ς˜
[
1
b1
(
µ− rf + 0.5ω2
ω2
)
+
(
1− 1
b1
)
ς˜ωuν
ω2
]
(75)
where ς˜ = ρσ ς + 1 − ρ, ς = θ1−(1−θ)ρa > 1, and (66). This expression is just (75) in the text.
Comparing with the result in the benchmark model, here ρa has replaced φ
−1, but otherwise the
assumption, (54), is the same as 20.
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Table 1: Effects of RU and RI on Consumption and the Equity Premium
U.S. data Full-information θ = 25% θ = 35% θ = 45% θ = 55%
pi (σ = 0.998) 0.06 0.023 0.073 0.050 0.039 0.034
pi (σ = 0.996) 0.06 0.023 0.048 0.036 0.031 0.028
µ 0.07 1 0.81 0.75 0.77 0.81
ρ∆c(1) 0.22 0 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.27
corr
(
∆c∗t+1, ut+1
)
0.21 1 0.31 0.46 0.58 0.68
Note: The U.S. data are based on Campbell (2003) and we set γ = 1.01.
Figure 1: The Effects of RI and RU on Long-run Consumption Risk
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Figure 2: The Effects of RI and RU on Long-run Consumption Risk
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Figure 3: The Effects of the Investment Horizon on Long-run Consumption Risk
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Figure 4: The Effects of RI on Consumption Volatility
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Figure 5: The Effects of RI on Consumption Correlation
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Figure 6: The Effects of RI and RU on Long-run Consumption Risk when ρuξ 6= 0
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